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Understanding Intuition 
The Case for Two Forms of Intuition1 
 
Viktor Dörfler ʹ Fran Ackermann 
Abstract 
Since the recent rejuvenation of intuition research within the management literature, signifi-
cant work has been done on conceptualizing intuition.  Whilst remarkable progress has been 
achieved in many areas of intuition, the role of intuition in creativity remains comparatively 
under-researched.  Through an extensive review of intuition literature, we believe that a rea-
son for this could be that intuition in the management literature is generally conceptualized 
as judgement.  In this paper we aim to extend our understanding of intuition in creativity by 
distinguishing between intuitive judgment and intuitive insight.  Strengthening our case, this 
paper builds on two previous research projects.  The first focuses on literature-based features 
of intuition and the second project builds a conceptual model of knowledge types.  Further 
informing the argument is PoláŶǇŝ ?ƐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĨŽĐĂůĂŶĚƐƵďƐŝĚŝĂƌǇĂǁareness.  These con-
siderations lead us to propose that there are two distinct kinds of intuition  W intuitive judge-
ment and intuitive insight. 
Keywords 
creativity, decision taking, intuition, personal knowledge, tacit knowledge 
  
                                                     
1 This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Management Learning, the 
'Journal for Critical, Reflexive Scholarship on Organisation and Learning'.  The definitive publisher-au-
thenticated version: Viktor Dörfler & Fran Ackermann (2012) Understanding Intuition: The Case for 
Two Forms of Intuition, Management Learning, 43(5): 545 ?564 DOI 10.1177/1350507611434686 is 
available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1350507611434686 
2 
Introduction 
The main contribution of this paper is introducing the distinction between intuitive insight 
and intuitive judgement.  The significance of distinguishing between these two concepts is 
that it provides us with a better understanding of the role of intuition in creativity, which is 
the least understood and researched area of intuition in management research.  Therefore, 
our findings help elucidate a better understanding of creativity and thus extend our 
knowledge of intuition.  Moreover, this is potentially valuable to knowledge oriented organi-
zations (Argyris & Schön, 1978; Davenport & Prusak, 2000) who place considerable emphasis 
on creativity, not only in the area of R&D, but also in a wide variety of business functions. 
In order to fully understand the rationale behind the argument presented in this paper, 
relevant literature substantiating the development of our argument is examined and several 
conceptual models briefly discussed.  In particular the paper explores the literature beyond 
management research to gather evidence about the use of intuition in creativity, and also 
ventures into Polányi ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇĂŶĚ:ƵŶŐ ?ƐƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇ ?ĂŵŽŶŐƐƚŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ĨŽƌŚĞůƉĨƵůƐƵƉƉůĞ ?
mentary models. 
Hodgkinson et al. (2008: 1) suggest that  ‘intuition lies at the heart of a number of dual-
process theories of cognition ?.  These dual process theories came about since cognition ap-
peared to be difficult to understand as a unitary construct (e.g. Evans, 2010).  There are many 
variants of the dual process theories, each with slightly different versions of duality.  The roots 
of this duality can be traced back to Socrates, Plato and Aristotle in the Western world; the 
first well-known one from the modern era is &ƌĞƵĚ ?Ɛ(1900) distinction of primary and sec-
ondary mental operations.  Neisser (1963) gives an overview of this early period, to finally 
propose the dualism of sequential vs. multiple processing.  Some more recent dualist concep-
tions include the extensional vs. intuitive reasoning (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), controlled 
vs. intuitive mode of cognitive function and reasoning vs. intuition (Kahneman, 2003), rational 
vs. experiential, which is later referred to as analytical-rational vs. intuitive-experiential 
(Epstein, 1994; Epstein et al., 1996) and System 1 vs. System 2 (Frankish, 2010; Stanovich & 
West, 1998, 2000).  Without trying to list all the different versions of the dual process theories 
(a review of models can be found in Evans, 2008) we indicate that they always distinguish 
between a process that comes close to intuiting and another which we can best describe as 
non-intuitive.2  Regardless of which version of the dual process theories one accepts, the du-
ality of intuitive and non-intuitive processing seems to have been widely recognised.  For ex-
ample, Barnard (1938: 291) recognized the importance of this duality for management and 
argued that, apart from good logical analysis, intuition is  ‘nowhere more indispensable than 
in executive arts ?. 
                                                     
2 dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞǀĂƌŝŽƵƐƚĞƌŵƐƵƐĞĚĂƐĂĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚƚŽ ?ŝŶƚƵŝƚŝǀĞ ? ?ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚďĞŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂů ? ?
Analysis does have some features that can be contrasted to intuition, most significantly that it is nor-
mally carried out step-by-step. However, the essence of analysis is dissecting things into smaller pieces, 
thus the opposite of analysis is actually synthesis rather than intuition. Furthermore, intuition can work 
ŝŶĨŽƌŵŽĨďŽƚŚĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐĂŶĚƐǇŶƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?^ŽƚŚĞƌĞĂƐŽŶĨŽƌƵƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ?ŶŽŶ-ŝŶƚƵŝƚŝǀĞ ?ŝƐƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽĂǀŽŝĚ
the vague use of terms as it may lead to contradiction and misunderstanding, as we will show later in 
the paper. 
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Research on intuition became increasingly popular in the last two decades in the manage-
ment literature and in the academic world more generally (E.g. Akinci & Sadler-Smith, 2011; 
Osbeck, 1999; Osbeck, 2001).  We see two reasons for this: (1) intuition is the perhaps least 
understood aspect of managerial cognition (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011) and (2) without un-
derstanding intuition it is impossible to develop any meaningful conceptualization of cogni-
tion.  For instance Chalmers (1998: 110) argues that intuition is  ‘ƚŚĞǀĞƌǇƌĂŝƐŽŶĚ ?ġƚƌĞ ? of the 
problem of cognition.  Thus the only consistent way of avoiding the problem of intuition 
would be to deny it completely; which would, in turn, mean denying the problem and the 
phenomenon of consciousness itself.  Examining the conceptualization of knowledge, Polányi 
(1969: 106) compares intuition to a sleeping monster, which, once awakened, may destroy 
our view of knowledge altogether.  However, we believe that if it is destructive trying to un-
derstand intuition then destruction is needed, as our view of knowledge and consciousness 
cannot be meaningful unless it accounts for intuition as well. 
In this paper we propose a provisional distinction of two types of intuition which we call 
intuitive judgement and intuitive insight.  This distinction helps us in developing a better un-
derstanding of creative intuition, which is perhaps the least understood of the various types 
of intuition (e.g. Dane & Pratt, 2009; Gore & Sadler-Smith, 2011; Sinclair, 2010).  We believe 
that offering this conceptualization contributes towards the overall goal of improving our un-
derstanding of intuition more generally. 
This paper builds on two previous research projects in which we were trying to establish 
intuition as a valid form of knowledge.  In the first case (Dörfler, Baracskai, Velencei, et al., 
2010) we examined the nature of personal knowledge to identify different knowledge types.  
We started from ZǇůĞ ?Ɛ (1949) distinction of  ‘knowing that ? and  ‘knowing how ?, to which we 
added three further types,  ‘why ?,  ‘what ? and  ‘it ?.  WĞĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚƚŚĂƚďŽƚŚƚŚĞ ‘ŬŶŽǁǁŚǇ ?ĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞ ‘ŬŶŽǁǁŚĂƚ ?ďĞůŽŶŐƚŽŝŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶ ? In the second case we surveyed the literature and iden-
tified a set of six features which define intuitive knowledge. (Dörfler & Ackermann, 2011)  
These six features of intuition resemble closely those of others (cf. Kahneman, 2003: 698; 
Sadler-Smith, 2008: 13).  Three of these apply to the process of intuiting and three to the 
outcome of such a process, the intuitive knowledge.  Intuiting is rapid (often labelled instan-
taneous), spontaneous (does not require effort and cannot be deliberately controlled) and 
alogical (meaning that it does not necessarily contradict the rules of logic but does not follow 
them either).  The outcome of the intuitive process is tacit (in that the intuitives cannot give 
account of how they arrived at the results), holistic (also often called gestalt, as it is concerned 
with the totality of a situation rather than parts of it), and the intuitor feels confident about 
their intuition (with no apparent reason in terms of evidence).  Alongside this process of 
searching for the features of intuition, we have recognized that all the reports, whether aca-
demic or practitioner, from a variety of fields, including management, psychology and philos-
ophy as well as reports from artists and scientists from diverse fields, mention two major 
areas in which intuition is used: namely decision taking and creative problem solving. 
Based on the above, we challenge one of the underlying assumptions of the vast majority 
of intuition research in the field of management: namely that all intuition is judgement.  As 
many of the management scholars interested in intuition are coming from the discipline of 
decision making/taking, this assumption appears to be taken for granted, so much so that it 
is usually not explicitly stated.  However, we believe that this implicit presumption limits our 
understanding of intuition, which is particularly salient in the case of creative intuition.  As we 
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will show, distinguishing between intuitive judgement and intuitive insight does not contra-
dict any of the findings arrived at when considering intuition-as-judgement, rather it adds an 
extra dimension to the previously suggested typologies and thus offers a richer picture of 
intuition.  It also does not directly contradict the distinction between intuition and insight as 
two related but distinct constructs (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Hodgkinson et al., 2008; Hogarth, 
2001).  Instead it refines the distinction: namely there is intuitive and non-intuitive insight, 
just as there is intuitive and non-intuitive judgement. 
As we will argue, we are not introducing a superfluous concept in an area which is already 
riddled with models and constructs.  Instead we believe that based on previous research the 
distinction between intuitive judgement and intuitive insight can help us achieve a more nu-
anced and comprehensive picture of intuition.  Although we agree with Isaack (1978: 919) 
that  ‘intellect cannot completely understand the intuition since the artificial tools, precon-
ceived categories, and symbols used by the intellect only represent reality and are not the 
substance of reality ?, we believe that it is important to try from an  ‘intuitive understanding of 
intuition ? to extract and logically develop concepts that can be debated. 
In the next section of this paper we establish intuition as a form of knowledge, emphasizing 
that in this research we are only interested in intuition as it operates at high levels of exper-
tise.  This helps build the argument by providing scope and focus.  Then we attempt to de-
scribe the process of intuiting; for this we need to first briefly revisit the concepts of focal and 
subsidiary awareness introduced by Polányi.  Finally, we introduce our idea of distinguishing 
between intuitive judgement and intuitive insight, offering it for debate as an additional view-
point in the ongoing development of the conceptual framework for intuition research.  As 
part of this discussion, we illustrate how they can be integrated into the existing typologies 
as a new dimension. 
Intuition as expert knowledge 
 ?Inspiration comes only to the prepared mind. ? 
Pasteur (quoted by Simon, 1983: 27) 
In terms of knowing, we can use our knowledge to understand something through analytical 
step-by-step reasoning, e.g. comparing and contrasting alternatives, evaluating them, exam-
ining their characteristics, the associated costs and benefits, etc.  However, such step-by-step 
reasoning is not the only way of knowing.  Intuitive knowledge is often described by scientists 
(see e.g. Beveridge, 1957; Hadamard, 1954; Koestler, 1971) and decision takers3 (see e.g. 
Barnard, 1938; Campbell & Mintzberg, 1991; Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 2004; Simon, 1987).  They 
ũƵƐƚ  ‘ŬŶŽǁ ? ? ŝŶĂŵŽŵĞŶƚ ǁŝ ŚŽƵƚŬŶŽǁŝŶŐŚŽǁŽƌǁŚǇƚŚĞǇ  ‘ŬŶŽǁ ?.  Thus the knowledge 
arrived at by means of intuiting we call intuitive knowledge.  Based on an examination of a 
wide range of literature (for example social and cognitive psychology, history and philosophy 
                                                     
3 The term decision taking is used explicitly as a distinction from decision making where the former 
refers to deciding about a course of action whilst the latter is a more comprehensive concept which 
includes other phases apart from decision taking, such as collecting information (intelligence) and gen-
erating alternatives. (Cf. Mintzberg et al., 1976; Simon, 1977) 
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of science, education), in this section we argue for the validity of intuitive knowledge.  Con-
ceptualizing intuition as intuitive knowledge, although limiting the scope of the intuition field, 
enables us to apply arguments originally developed for the domain of knowledge to the do-
main of intuition.  We also argue that intuition worthy of trust (cf. Hogarth, 2001; Kahneman 
& Klein, 2009; Salas et al., 2010) appears to be experienced by experts and thus we limit our 
research to expert intuition.  These limitations help us make our argument for the two types 
of intuition tighter. 
Intuitive knowledge 
In spite of the large number of reports and studies in favour of intuition, it was not fully ex-
plored systematically in the mainstream academic literature until recently (e.g. Akinci & 
Sadler-Smith, 2012; Dane & Pratt, 2007, 2009; Gore & Sadler-Smith, 2011; Hodgkinson et al., 
2008; Hodgkinson, Sadler-Smith, Sinclair, et al., 2009; Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005).  The reason 
is probably, as Tsoukas (2005a: 142) says, that we prefer explicit knowledge obtained through 
well-defined, if possible standardized, procedures and conversely we mistrust intuitive 
knowledge obtained through ad-hoc or, at least, less-defined practices.  However this percep-
tion has changed and more researchers are now recognizing that the deliberative conscious 
reasoning is not the only way of arriving at valid knowledge. (Hodgkinson, Sadler-Smith, 
Burke, et al., 2009: 279) 
Of course, this does not mean that scientists have not used their intuition before, only 
typically they pretended that new knowledge has always been arrived at by the established 
 ‘ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐŵĞƚŚŽĚ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƚŝŵĞ(e.g. Schrödinger, 1958).  Nevertheless, for decades there have 
been philosophers and scientists-turned-philosophers, fighting to establish intuition as a valid 
form of knowledge.  For instance Bruner (1966: 2), after building up his reputation in the ac-
cepted mainstream psychology, argued for the important role of intuition, particularly in con-
sidering the most significant scientific achievements:   ‘Reaching for knowledge with the right 
hand is science.  Yet to say only that much of science is to overlook one of its excitements, for 
the great hypotheses of science are gifts carried in the left hand. ?  Furthermore, he empha-
sizes (Bruner, 1977: 67) that it is usually the most esteemed scientists who earn the label 
 ‘ŝŶƚƵŝƚŝǀĞ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝŶŝƚƐĞůĨŝƐĂƐƚƌŽŶŐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐĨŝŶĚŝŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶǀĂůƵĂďůĞ ? 
Spinoza (1677: Part 2, Proposition 40, Scholium 42) distinguished three kinds of 
knowledge: (1) opinion or imagination, (2) reason and (3) intuitive knowledge; and without 
much explanation declared that intuitive knowledge is the most powerful of the three 
(Spinoza, 1677: Part 5, Proposition 36, Scholium).  Jung (1921: §770) distinguished four psy-
chological functions: thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition.  He was probably the first to 
emphasize the intrinsic certainty and self-referential nature of intuitive knowledge.  Bergson 
(1946) similarly argued that intuition is a superior form of knowledge; furthermore arguing 
that no complex thought can be arrived at other than by means of intuiting.  He sees the role 
of intuition (Bergson, 1911: 238-239) as helping to arrive at new ideas, after which we should 
abandon intuition and work on building the body of knowledge using the new intuitively ob-
tained knowledge.  Once we start feeling lost, we should get in touch with our intuition again 
(often undoing what we have done in the deliberative phase) and so forth in cycles.  Therefore 
Bergson (1946: 33 ff.) argues for intuition as a method, particularly in metaphysics and in 
areas of complex, dynamic and abstract thinking, contrasting intuition to intellect. 
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It must be noted that identifying intuition with intuitive knowledge is a limitation.  We do 
not intend neglecting intuition outside the area of knowledge, however this constraint helps 
provide a focus for this paper.  Moreover it must be acknowledged that intuition also appears 
in other faculties, such as feelings and emotions.  Gerard (cited by Vaughan, 1979: 66-80) 
distinguishes four levels of intuitive awareness: the physical, the emotional, the mental and 
the spiritual.  Extending the examination of intuition to the other three faculties can foster a 
deeper understanding of intuition as well as explain the somatic and affective charges often 
reported about intuition.  Elsewhere (Dörfler & Szendrey, 2008) we have focused on this 
multi-potential aspect of intuition and more generally of cognition. 
Intuition at high level of expertise 
When reviewing the literature on intuition, we initially believed that there is an additional 
feature, namely that intuition only appears where high levels of expertise exist.  Some au-
thors, for example, Crossan et al. (1999) and C. C. Miller and Ireland (2005) consider expert 
intuition as particular type of intuition.  We briefly analyse these two considerations in order 
to illustrate why we view expertise as something that characterizes valuable intuition rather 
than being a type of intuition in its own right, and based on this examination limit our focus 
to intuition of experts. 
Crossan et al. (1999: 526) distinguish between expert intuition and entrepreneurial intui-
tion.  They argue that the former is past pattern oriented; thus the experts  ‘almost spontane-
ously ? apply their existing knowledge in a familiar or similar to familiar situation.  On the con-
trary, the latter is supposedly future- and change-oriented, thus the ability to make novel 
connections and discern possibilities.  The problem with this distinction is that the proposed 
two kinds of intuition reside in different dimensions.  We can have different levels of expertise 
and we can be entrepreneurial to varying degrees.  A possible relationship is that one needs 
certain minimal level of expertise to be entrepreneurial in any field and that higher level of 
knowledge means better entrepreneurship. 
Miller and Ireland (2005: 21) distinguish between  ‘holistic hunch ? and  ‘automated exper-
tise ?.  The first  ‘corresponds to judgement or choice made through a subconscious synthesis 
of information drawn from diverse experiences ?, whilst ƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚŝƐ ‘ŵĞƌĞůǇ ?ƐƵďĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐ
application of learned rules.  Of course, for the holistic hunch to be able to synthesize infor-
mation from diverse experiences, that information needs to be there.  So, again, this simple 
distinction cannot be maintained.  It is also a well-known phenomenon that experts will not 
only be able to handle situations they have already experienced or for what they have learned 
rules (e.g. Sadler-Smith, 2008: 257) but will also be able to go beyond the existing knowledge. 
Whilst many researchers consider intuition useful, other scholars argue fiercely against it.  
If we examine arguments from the latter, that is those who have provided experimental evi-
dence on the failure of intuition (such as Bowers et al., 1990: 97; Schoemaker & Russo, 1993: 
27; Trailer & Morgan, 2004), we will see that many of them ŚĂǀĞĞǆĂŵŝŶĞĚŶŽǀŝĐĞƐ ?ŝŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?
For instance, Trailer and Morgan (2004) observed that undergraduate students of business 
administration make poor intuitive judgements in the field of physics.  In contrast, those who 
have found intuition useful in their respective fields of research (such as Burke & Miller, 1999 
in management; Hayashi, 2001 in leadership; Keren, 1987 in the game of bridge), typically 
focused on expert intuition.  As empirical (and particularly the experimental) evidence in the 
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area of intuition in management is relatively scarce, the previous argument is not conclusive 
but the findings appear to illustrate that expertise contributes to effective intuition (Salas et 
al., 2010). 
What certainly appears to be the case is that intuition, at least good intuition, appears 
where there is high level of expertise. (See e.g. Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Prietula & Simon, 
1989)  This, however, does not help in distinguishing intuition from non-intuition.  Even 
though one can learn certain analytical steps and apply them at a low level of expertise, higher 
level of expertise certainly entails both better intuition and better analysis.  But there is some-
thing important about the relationship between intuition and the level of expertise.  To ap-
proach the relationship between intuition and expertise from a different angle, it is possible 
to start from the research on levels of knowledge.  There are three distinct streams of re-
search on knowledge levels with very different approaches.  Simon with various colleagues 
(e.g. Chase & Simon, 1973; Simon, 1996) and Ericsson (e.g. Ericsson, 1996; Ericsson et al., 
1993) used primarily experimental approaches, supplemented with verbal reports.  Dreyfus 
and Dreyfus (e.g. Benner, 2004; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, 2005) adopted phenomenological 
observations in various natural contexts.  Dörfler et al. (2009) applied conceptual modelling 
based on a geometrical analogy and Gestalt-like examination of well-known phenomena.  All 
these researchers argue that when one achieves a high level of expertise, intuition naturally 
emerges and at the highest level it becomes the dominant form of knowledge (for a more 
detailed overview see Gobet & Chassy, 2009).  Therefore we agree with Dane and Pratt (2009: 
5-6) that expertise is an antecedent to trustworthy intuition and hence we are only interested 
in intuition in those with a high level of expertise, what Sadler-Smith and Shefy (2004) call 
 ‘intuition-as-expertise ?, Kahneman and Klein (2009) call  ‘intuitive expertise ? and Salas et al. 
(2010) call  ‘expertise-based intuition ?. 
Having established intuitive knowledge as a valid form of knowledge in the first part of this 
section, in the second part we limit the scope and narrow the focus: namely focusing on intu-
ition as knowledge (and intuiting as knowing respectively) where considerable expertise is 
held, and we are trying to argue for distinguishing between intuitive judgement and intuitive 
insight as two meaningful forms of intuitive knowledge.  To make this argument possible we 
need to look more closely at intuition at work, namely how the process of intuiting is struc-
tured. 
The process of intuiting 
According to Lieberman (2000: 109) intuition is at best regarded as mysterious and unexplain-
able.  Seligman and Kahana (2009: 399) suggest that this might be because we do not under-
stand its  ‘cognitive architecture ?.  Hammond (2010: 329) further argues that we should first 
become familiar with this mysterious process of intuition and therefore in this section we aim 
to shed some light on what lies behind the mystery  W particularly as it will help develop our 
argument for the two forms of intuition.  In order to describe the process of intuiting we first 
need to briefly revisit Polányi ?Ɛmodel of focal and subsidiary knowing, which is based on his 
conception of tacit knowing (Polányi, 1966b; Tsoukas, 2005b).  Polányi (1966a) argues that all 
tacit knowing can be explained on the basis of focal and subsidiary components and that, in 
turn, all knowing is, at least partly, tacit. 
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Focal and subsidiary 
Whilst examining the act of knowing Polányi (1962a: 55-65) realized that e.g. when hammer-
ing in a nail, we are differently aware of the hammer and of the nail.  What is the focus of our 
act, he called  ‘focal awareness ? (driving in the nail); which is supported by  ‘subsidiary aware-
ness ? of everything else (feeling in our palm, hammer, etc.).  Polányi (1966b: 7-19) used these 
two kinds of awareness to explain the act of tacit knowing.  To help in conceptualizing the 
process of intuiting, we will briefly review Polányi ?Ɛ model of the two kinds of awareness and 
the related concepts of focal and subsidiary and knowing, (following Polányi ?Ɛargument); to 
these we add the description of focal and subsidiary knowledge (following Baracskai, 1997: 
107-110).  The same train of thought in a wider scope can be found in Dörfler, Baracskai, 
Velencei, et al. (2010).  In the next subsection, we will apply the distinction of focal and sub-
sidiary to intuition and intuiting which will help us explain the structure of intuiting. 
In his original description Polányi (1966b: 11) started by borrowing metaphors from anat-
omy: 
 “ ?ǁĞare aware of the proximal term of an act of tacit knowing in the ap-
pearance of its distal term; we are aware of that from which we are attend-
ing to another thing, in the appearance of that thing. ? 
For further clarification the use of these terms is illustrated through an example.  If we try 
with our eyes closed to use a stick to explore a room, initially we will concentrate on the end 
of the stick in our hand, more precisely, on the feelings experienced in our fingers.4  Thus 
concentrating on the near end (proximal term) of the stick, even though we are really inter-
ested in what is at the far end of the stick (distal term), the room.  However after a short 
period, we forget about the stick in our hand and start picturing the ƌŽŽŵ ?ƐůĂǇŽƵƚ.  This is 
what is meant by attending from the proximal to the distal.  Furthermore, Polányi (1962a: 55-
65) realized that we are differently aware of proximal and distal.  The awareness of the distal 
he calls focal, as it is in the focus, and the awareness of the proximal he labels subsidiary.  In 
the previous case, the room is in the focus and we have subsidiary awareness of the feelings 
in palm, vibrations, etc.  Using another example, whilst writing, the meaning of the text is in 
the focus and the letters, grammatical rules, etc. are in the subsidiary awareness.  We can see 
that knowing the proximal is usually tacit as  ‘our subsidiary awareness of a thing may not 
suffice to make it identifiable ? (Polányi, 1966a: 4) whilst knowing the distal is always explicit 
as  ‘focal awareness is always conscious ? (Polányi, 1962b: 602). 
What is in focus requires focal attention and that kind of attention can be paid only to one 
thing at a time (Anderson, 2005; Broadbent, 1958; Cherry, 1953; Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963; 
Sullivan, 1976; Treisman, 1964).  This also means thĂƚƚŚĞƌĞƐƚŽĨƚŚĞ ?A? ? ‘ƐůŽƚƐ ?(Baddeley, 
1994; G. A. Miller, 1956) in the working memory can only belong to the subsidiary attention.  
This also fits the previous examples about exploring the room and writing: we can pay focal 
attention to one whole entity (a single distal term) and subsidiary attention to multiple par-
ticulars (i.e. several proximal terms). 
                                                     
4 Polányi ?ƐŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůĞǆĂŵƉůĞƚĂůŬƐĂďŽƵƚexploring a cavern using a probe. 
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The above discussion of focal and subsidiary awareness follows from the literature.  How-
ever, to apply the same line of thinking to intuition is not straightforward.  Therefore we use 
the more overarching concept of  ‘knowledge ?ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚŽĨ ‘ŝŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶ ? to facilitate this explora-
tion (as we limited the notion of intuition to intuitive knowledge, what applies to all 
knowledge/knowing should also apply to the intuitive subset of knowledge/knowing).  Alt-
hough there are various conceptualizations of the distinction between knowledge and know-
ing (see e.g. Nicolini et al., 2003; Polányi, 1962a, 1969; Tsoukas, 1998, 2005a), in the case of 
personal knowledge (as opposed to organizational knowledge) all these authors agree that 
knowledge is mental content.  Knowing is then seen as a process through which knowledge is 
used, such as learning, thinking, or applying knowledge. 
In considering again the example of writing, this time from the viewpoint of explicit and 
tacit knowledge, letters, words and rules of grammar belong to the explicit domain (i.e. these 
can be learned in the classroom).  However we cannot teach in the classroom how to write a 
good poem (i.e. it belongs to the domain of tacit knowledge).  As it was said previously, letters, 
words and the rules of grammar are the particulars (proximal term, subsidiary attention), 
whilst the poem corresponds to the whole entity (distal term, focal attention).  Thus, the sub-
sidiary knowledge is explicit and the focal knowledge is tacit.  However earlier in the paper, 
when discussing Polányi ?ƐǁŽƌŬ, we established that in terms of knowing, the distal is charac-
terized by explicit knowing and the proximal is characterized by tacit knowing.  So, the tacit-
explicit relation now appears to be reversed (see Figure 1).  We have identified an interesting 
contrast between knowledge and knowing.  Whilst we can explicitly identify what we are fo-
cusing on (focal knowing), we are unable to actually provide an explicit description of this 
content (focal knowledge).  This corresponds to being able to say that we are writing a (good) 
poem but this does not mean that we can put into words what a good poem is.  Moreover, 
we usually cannot identify the particulars of the subsidiary attention (subsidiary knowing).  
However, if someone would point these out for us, we might be able to provide an explicit 
account about the content of these particulars (subsidiary knowledge).  We cannot say which 
letters and rules of grammar we use when writing the poem but, if someone asked about 
them, we could explain them explicitly.  The root cause of the difference is that tacit-explicit 
knowledge refers to the nature of the content; whilst the tacit-explicit knowing is about iden-
tifying this content. 
 
 rules of grammar good poem 
 subsidiary focal 
knowledge 
explicit tacit 
mental content 
knowing 
tacit explicit 
identifying the content 
Figure 1: Knowledge and knowing when writing a poem 
So what we focus on can be characterized by tacit knowledge and explicit knowing, whilst 
our subsidiary awareness is characterized by explicit knowledge and tacit knowing.  In the 
next subsection we apply these findings to intuition (intuitive knowledge) and intuiting (pro-
cess of intuitive knowing) in order to understand the structure of intuiting. 
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The structure of intuiting 
In this section we describe a characteristic which leads to an apparent contradiction between 
how Simon (1987) and Mintzberg (1994) see intuition; this contradiction, together with the 
focal-subsidiary distinction serve as the starting point for understanding the structure of in-
tuiting.  According to Kahneman and Tversky (1982: 124) intuition is arrived at  ‘without the 
use of analytic methods or deliberate calculation ?, Vance et al. (2007) describe it as a non-
linear mode of thinking, Barnard (1938: 301 ff.) calls it  ‘non-logical ? to contrast it to the logical 
process of analytical reasoning, Rowan (1986: 84) defines it as  ‘knowledge gained without 
rational thought. ?  Although the terminology is slightly different, in every case the message is 
that intuiting operates independently of the general principles of reasoning that Russell 
(1946: 379) calls logic.  We call this mode of operation alogical, meaning that it neither follows 
(logical) nor contradicts (illogical) the rules of logic. 
Simon (1987: 61) emphasizes that intuition and analysis are not operating independent of 
each other but rather in a complementary manner.  Furthermore, he states (Simon, 1987: 63) 
that  ‘Intuition and judgement  W at least good judgement  W are simply analyses frozen into 
habit and into the capacity for rapid response through recognition. ?  Mintzberg (1994) chal-
ůĞŶŐĞƐ^ŝŵŽŶ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶŝƐĂďŽƵƚ synthesis and synthesis can never 
be derived from analyses.  Considering the foundational status of these two thinkers, it seems 
reasonable to ask whether this apparent contradiction can be resolved.  Simon (e.g. March & 
Simon, 1993; Simon, 1983, 1992) usually explained intuition as experts recognizing patterns 
relevant to their experience.  Kahneman (2010, personal communication) said that he was 
sure that ^ŝŵŽŶ ?ƐǀŝĞǁŽĨŝŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐƐǇŶƚŚĞƐŝƐ, and this is completely consistent with 
the view of intuition as pattern recognition (e.g. Hogarth, 2010; Simon, 1987).  Perhaps there 
is a simple answer to why Simon talks about  ‘analyses frozen into habit ?: analysis here may 
not mean the opposite of synthesis but the opposite of intuition, which seems plausible from 
the previous quote.  This would mean that Simon meant  ‘non-intuitions frozen into habit ? 
constituting intuition.  Below we explore whether it is possible to understand how these non-
intuitions may constitute intuition by applying to intuition/intuiting what we have discussed 
about knowledge/knowing in terms of the focal-subsidiary distinction.  Jung (1921: §772) 
starts from the end-product of intuiting trying to find its ingredients, and he finds that intui-
tion can usually be decomposed into its constituents and by doing so the intuitor can arrive 
at a logical explanation of the intuitive outcome. 
By combining the two descriptions (i.e. Jung and Polányi) it is possible to gain a better 
understanding of intuition.  The distal term that we pay focal attention to, is the focal intui-
tion/intuiting; it corresponds to the whole entity (the room we are exploring using a stick and 
the meaning of the text when writing).  Based on the argument outlined in the first part of 
this section, we can expect that the focal intuition is tacit and alogical and that the focal intu-
iting is explicit and logical.  As we can identify the outcome of intuiting, we can accept that 
focal intuiting is explicit and as its content cannot be taught in a classroom setting, the focal 
intuition is considered tacit.  The proximal term of intuition, what we pay subsidiary attention 
to, is the subsidiary intuition/intuiting.  :ƵŶŐ ?Ɛ constituents belong here; they correspond to 
the particulars from the first subsection of this section (the near-end of the stick when explor-
ing the room or the knowledge of letters and grammar when writing a poem).  We expect 
that the subsidiary intuition is logical and can be put into words (as it could be taught in a 
classroom setting) and that the subsidiary intuiting is tacit and alogical (as we cannot identify 
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the particulars).  Of course, we could pay attention to the particulars, only then we would 
probably lose the sight of the whole entity and focus upon a particular aspect; however, if we 
focus on the whole entity the particulars get submerged in the whole. (Polányi, 1961: 460) 
What we have not explained so far, is how the subsidiary particulars come together into 
the whole entity on which we focus (Polányi, 1965: 802) in the process of intuiting. (Figure 2)  
This from-to process (Polányi, 1968: 30), by which the particulars fuse into the whole entity, 
lasts as long as the person sustains it.  Polányi (1965: 800) calls this process  ‘integration ? and 
he extends the concept of tacit knowing to this integrative process (Polányi, 1962b: 602): 
What is subsidiarily known is tacitly known; but it seems appropriate to ex-
ƚĞŶĚƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨ ?ƚĂĐŝƚŬŶŽǁŝŶŐ ?ƚŽŝŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĞŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƐƵďƐŝĚŝĂƌǇ
to focal knowing.  The structure of tacit knowing is then the structure of this 
integrative process, and knowing is tacit to the extent to which it has such a 
structure. 
 
 
Figure 2: Focal and subsidiary intuition 
For better understanding of subsidiary intuition, we need to figure out what the particulars 
are.  :ƵŶŐ ?ƐĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŚĞůƉƐŚĞƌĞ Pthese are the components of the explanation  W this is why 
it always has to be obtained afterwards.  There can be  ‘rules ? to follow and  ‘methods ? to apply 
 W but they have little to do with how we arrived at the intuitive knowledge.  We might have 
used some of the  ‘ƌƵůĞƐ ?Žƌ ‘ŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ ?, only they have undergone a tacit process of integration 
and thus we cannot identify them.  Elsewhere (Dörfler, Baracskai & Velencei, 2010) we have 
used the example of jokes which are logical with hindsight  W but only with hindsight.  The 
 ‘ƌƵůĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ ?ĐĂŶŶŽƚĐŽŶũƵƌĞƚŚĞŝŶƚƵŝƚŝǀĞůĞĂƉ but once we have arrived at the intui-
tive outcome, we may use them to explain it.  Sonenshein (2007) arrived at a similar model in 
the special case of moral decisions. 
Now that we have described the intuitive process in terms of the particulars going through 
a tacit process of integration we put forward our main argument that we can conceptualize 
two distinct types of intuition  W these are sufficiently similar to identify both as intuition but, 
at the same time, sufficiently different to distinguish between them. 
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Intuition in judgement and insight 
One of the insights that emerged whilst reviewing the literature on the features of intuition 
was that most if not all accounts of intuitive knowledge can be located in one of two areas: 
decision taking and creativity.  We came to the same conclusion through building a conceptual 
model of the types of knowledge, as noted above.  Whilst not being sufficient grounds for a 
conclusive inference that there are only two different kinds of intuition (cf. Dane & Pratt, 
2009; Glöckner & Witteman, 2009; Gore & Sadler-Smith, 2011), this insight became the start-
ing point of this inquiry.  However, in order to build a more solid foundation we examined in 
more depth prior empirical and conceptual work.  Whilst there are other typologies of intui-
tion in the literature, we adopted a different perspective from these, enabling us to gain a 
different understanding and which we believe helps move researchers closer to conceptual-
izing the role of intuition in creativity.  Examples of these other typologies include Dane and 
Pratt (2009) who distinguish problem solving, moral and creative intuitions; Glöckner and 
Witteman (2009) who differentiate associative, matching, accumulative and constructive in-
tuitions; and Gore and Sadler-Smith (2011) who identify problem-solving, creative, social and 
moral intuitions as primary types (the secondary types being composites of the primary 
types), etc.  The three mentioned examples are very different.  Dane and Pratt (2009) distin-
guish between various types of intuition, Glöckner and Witteman (2009) model is concerned 
with the processes underlying intuition, while Gore and Sadler-Smith (2011) offer a typology 
of intuition types as well as a model of the processes of intuiting underlying these intuitions.  
All these distinctions, however, appear to presume that intuition is judgement.  Providing 
substance to our exploration, Sinclair (2010: 382) suggests that the decision paradigm of in-
tuition is potentially too narrow to account for a broader picture of intuition.  This recognition 
is our departure point and extending this narrow framework is what we want to achieve with 
this paper.  We will also show that our distinction between intuitive judgement and intuitive 
insight can be added to the existing typologies resulting in a richer picture of intuition. 
Intuitive judgement 
We do not intend to provide a detailed discussion here on intuition specifically focused on 
intuitive judgement, as that would mean including virtually all intuition research in the field 
of management.  Instead, we will explore a couple of reference points in order to extrapolate 
the research in the field into a conceptual foundation on which we can build our argument 
for delineating the concept of intuitive insight from the concept of intuitive judgement. 
A large number of researchers whose work was explored in the literature review (including 
Agor, 1984, 1989; Barnard, 1938; Dane & Pratt, 2007, 2009; Dean & Mihalasky, 1974; 
Hodgkinson, Sadler-Smith, Burke, et al., 2009; Hogarth, 2001; Klein, 2004; O'Connor, 2002; 
Simon, 1987; Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005) talk about the role intuition plays in decision taking.  
It is frequently argued that decision takers tend to rely more on their intuition when they are 
in senior positions, in situations that are messy and where time is short.  This resonates well 
with our above argument on intuition and expertise. 
As illustrated in the extant literature (as noted earlier), intuition has been primarily exam-
ined in terms of its role in decision taking (within the management literature).  For example, 
13 
when Barnard (1938: 235) describes intuition as being an important part of the executive 
process he talks about decision taking: 
It transcends the capacity of merely intellectual methods, and the techniques 
of discriminating the factors of the situation.  The terms pertinent to it are 
 “feeling ? ? “judgement ? ? “sense ? ?  “proportion ? ? “balance ? ? “appropriate-
ness ? ? It is a matter of art rather than science, and is aesthetic rather than 
logical. 
This is not surprising, as the framework for investigating intuition, in the management field, 
stems from observing decision takers  W specifically that they often do not use the tools and 
techniques taught on management courses and described in academic decision books but 
rather rely on their intuition.  In these situations, decision takers use their intuition in produc-
ing a judgement.  This implies that the role of intuition in e.g. generating decision alternatives 
is not of primary concern, although it is often noted that intuition may play role in all phases 
of the decision process (e.g. Agor, 1989).  As the term intuitive judgement is often used in 
much of the intuition literature in the field of management (e.g. Dane & Pratt, 2009; Gilovich 
et al., 2002; Hodgkinson, Sadler-Smith, Burke, et al., 2009; Hogarth, 2001) and it is also very 
descriptive, we keep this term and will use it for describing the intuition of the decision taker. 
Intuitive insight 
 ? ?ŝƚŝƐďǇůŽŐŝĐƚŚĂƚǁĞƉƌŽǀĞ ?ďƵƚďǇintuition that we discover ? 
Poincaré (1914: 129) 
The other part of the reviewed (non-management) literature (e.g. Bergson, 1946; Beveridge, 
1957; Bruner, 1966; Hadamard, 1954; Hong, 2006b; Poincaré, 1914; Popper, 1968) focuses 
on intuition in creativity.  There seems to be a general agreement that intuition is a necessary 
component of creativity (cf. Polányi, 1946; Polányi, 1962a, 1966b); at least, the creation of 
any great novum (new knowledge) appears to be based on intuition.  Based on recent re-
search involving in-depth interviews with Nobel Laureates and creative people of similar 
standing (Dörfler & Eden, 2011), we are inclined to believe that no significant creative result 
has been achieved in any other way than by means of intuition.  Some of the management 
literature also mentions and, occasionally, discusses in depth the role intuition plays in crea-
tivity (e.g. Claxton, 1998; Dane & Pratt, 2009; Hodgkinson, Sadler-Smith, Burke, et al., 2009; 
Sinclair, 2010); however, apart from notable exceptions (Sinclair, 2010), intuition in creativity 
is still viewed as judgement.  Naturally, the creative process may involve intuitive judgements, 
e.g. judging which path to pursue in the course of a research progress.  However, we argue 
that there is intuition which is not judgement, which actually produces the novum (new 
knowledge).  This is what we call intuitive insight. 
Scientists, artists and philosophers as well as those examining scientists, artists and philos-
ophers, report on the intuition of creative individuals.  As Hadamard (1954) shows through a 
number of examples, the use of intuition in creativity (in his case in mathematical discoveries) 
is a rule rather than a curiosum.  Popper (1968: 8) agrees and further argues that there cannot 
be a logical method of having ideas and that ĞǀĞƌǇĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌǇĐŽŶƚĂŝŶƐ ‘ĂĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞŝŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶ
ĞƌŐƐŽŶ ?ƐƐĞŶƐĞ ? The descriptions of intuition in this literature mention all the characteristics 
of intuition noted above or elsewhere in the management literature (e.g. Dane & Pratt, 2007; 
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Kahneman, 2003; Sadler-Smith, 2008).  If we accept that those characteristics define intuition 
then what fits the definition has to be considered intuition. 
Here we take a step back to approach the intuitive insight from the perspective of the 
insight as previously we approached it from the perspective of intuition.  Several scholars, 
such as Hogarth (2001: 12, 250-254), Vance et al. (2007: 169-170), Sadler-Smith (2008: 30-31; 
2009: 91) and Dane and Pratt (2009: 4) emphasize that there are a number of seemingly sim-
ilar concepts in relation intuition, one of these being insight.  Insight in these cases refers to 
the process of arriving at the solution of well-structured problems (Simon, 1973).  Sadler-
Smith and Shefy (2007: 189) explicitly talk about insight in  ‘the context of a well-defined prob-
lem ?, and they give examples in which people explain the way of arriving at a solution, this 
solution can be objectively checked for being correct and so forth.  Solving well-structured 
problems, however, does not require creating new knowledge.  As in the case of judgement, 
there may be two kinds of insight: an intuitive and a non-intuitive one (Figure 3).  Non-intui-
tive insight is at work in the case of well-structured problems, a typical one being the Prisoner 
in the Tower (Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 2007: 189), whilst ill-structured problems call for intuitive 
insight. 
 
Figure 3: Intuitive and analytical parts of judgment and insight 
Solutions of ill-structured problems arrived at by intuitive insight always have a degree of 
subjectivity and, even if the creative person can demonstrate the relationships between the 
parts of the solution, the way of arriving at this solution will remain inexpressible in words or 
other symbols.  We provide three typical examples here for illustration.  Gauss gives an ac-
count of a solution to a long-standing problem he obtained through intuitive insight (Hong, 
2006a: 144):   ‘The riddle solved itself as lighting strikes, and I myself could not tell or show 
the connection between what I knew before, what I last used to experiment with, and what 
produced the final success. ?  More generally about his findings he says (Polányi, 1962a: 131):  
 ‘I have had my solutions for a long time but I do not yet know how I am to arrive at them. ?  
Poincaré ?ƐƐƚŽƌǇ is probably the most often quoted example of intuitive insight in science (see 
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e.g. Damasio, 1994; Goldberg, 1983b; Hadamard, 1954; Polányi & Prosch, 1977; Vaughan, 
1979).  Poincaré had spent a long time in a futile attempt to prove that there cannot be func-
tions with certain characteristics, called Fuchsian functions.  However, whilst on an excursion 
he forget about his work and then, just when he was putting his foot on the step, in a flash of 
intuitive insight he not only realized that such functions can exist, but he basically defined the 
first known class of Fuchsian functions on the spot (Poincaré, 1914: 53):   ‘I made no verifica-
tion, and had no time to do so, since I took up the conversation again as soon as I had sat 
down in the break, but I felt absolute certainty at once. ?  A good example from a field outside 
science is Mozart, who is often quoted trying to explain how for him music does happen in 
time but rather he conceives it as a whole.  He also confesses (quoted by Goldberg, 1983a: 
178):   ‘Whence and how they come, I know not, nor can I force them. ? 
Sometimes, however, the creative person cannot even explain the relationships between 
the parts of the solution.  This assertion is illustrated through cases when the relationships 
are eventually discovered only substantially later  W and sometimes by people other than the 
creator of the novum.  We illustrate this with two famous examples from the history of sci-
ence.  dŚĞĨŝƌƐƚ ŝƐĂŶĂŶĞĐĚŽƚĞƚŽůĚďǇƉŚǇƐŝĐŝƐƚƐĂďŽƵƚŝƌĂĐ ?ƐĞƋƵĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞƵƐƵĂůůǇ
considered the second most brilliant result of theoretical physiĐƐ ?ĂĨƚĞƌŝŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨ
general relativity).  Someone else had to point out to him that his equations actually predicted 
anti-matter, to which Dirac responded: my equations were smarter than I was.  The other 
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞŝƐĂƌǁŝŶ ?Ɛ(1859) theory of evolution by natural selection.  He introduced two con-
cepts that signified only one phenomenon, namely  ‘fitness ? and  ‘natural selection ?.  It was 
ŽŶůǇĂĨƚĞƌĂǁŬŝŶƐ ?(1989) introduction of (selfish) genes into the theory of evolution that it 
became clear that we actually do need two concepts as we need to talk about the survival of 
fittest genes whilst the natural selection operates upon the individual members of species. 
Thus drawing on literature from outside the field of management, we show that there is a 
type of insight which is obtained in a way that demonstrates the features we expect from 
intuition.  This does not contradict the distinction between intuition and insight described by 
Hogarth (2001), Dane and Pratt (2007) and Sadler-Smith (2008) amongst others, as they are 
ĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚŝŶŐďĞƚǁĞĞŶŝŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ ‘ŶŽŶ-ŝŶƚƵŝƚŝǀĞ ?ŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐ ?This is very important as the two 
are similar in many ways and they should not be confused.  We, however, are adding a further 
nuance to this distinction by identifying a version of insight which is intuitive, thus also achiev-
ing symmetry with judgement which also has intuitive ĂŶĚ ‘ŶŽŶ-ŝŶƚƵŝƚŝǀĞ ?ǀĞƌƐŝŽŶƐ ?see Figure 
3). 
Discussion of the two intuitions 
Once we managed to conceptually delineate intuitive judgement from intuitive insight, we 
found some traces of similar ideas in the literature, although these were not elaborated in 
any substantial detail.  Perhaps most importantly, Polányi (Polányi & Prosch, 1977: 96 ff.) dis-
tinguishes  ‘strategic intuition ?, which points to a direction worth pursuing, and  ‘concluding 
intuition ?, which gets us to a novum, to a (creative) solution of a problem.  The first corre-
sponds to intuitive judgement and the second corresponds to intuitive insight.  Similarly, 
Bruner (1977: 62) talks about intuition in decisions and problem solving.  Particularly, he uses 
the example of mathematicians (Bruner, 1977: 55-56) to describe intuition in judging whether 
a solution is correct or an approach to problem can be fruitful as distinct from intuition which 
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suddenly reaches a solution.  In the management field, based on a series of empirical studies 
Agor (1986: 11-14) identified three ways in which executives use intuition: as an explorer,  ‘to 
foresee the correct path to follow ? which corresponds to intuitive judgement; as a  ‘synthesizer 
and integrator ? which comes close to intuitive insight; and as what  ‘might be termed eclectic ?, 
which is a combination of the previous two.  These three works mention uses of intuition 
which come close to what we call intuitive judgement and intuitive insight; however, none of 
them delineates the two and examines the consequences of this delineation.  Duggan (2007) 
attempts making a similar distinction, however, whilst he accumulated significant amount of 
interesting material, some of which can be used in support of our argument, he fails in creat-
ing meaningful categories and also chooses unfortunate labels.  For example,  ‘ordinary intui-
tion ? is not clearly specified and sometimes it appears to be some sort of miscellaneous cate-
gory.  The distinction between  ‘expert intuition ? and  ‘strategic intuition ? resembles the previ-
ously mentioned expert vs. entrepreneurial intuition distinction.  While some of ƵŐŐĂŶ ?Ɛ ex-
planations suggest that he might have thought of something similar to our distinction be-
tween intuitive judgement and intuitive insight, his choice of category labels is very mislead-
ing.  When we think of strategy, we normally relate it primarily to decisions and Polányi 
(Polányi & Prosch, 1977) used the same term with a meaning close to intuitive judgement.  
Therefore, while we think that there is significant amount of interesting discussions offered 
by Duggan, we do not think that his categories are viable as they stand. 
As we have mentioned earlier, we see the distinction between intuitive judgement and 
intuitive insight as an additional dimension to existing typologies.  For instance, in the case of 
moral intuition, we can have an intuitive moral judgement, e.g. classifying an action as good 
or evil, and we can also create a new moral value through intuitive moral insight, e.g. that all 
men are born equal.  See examples in Figure 4 below. 
 
 Intuitive judgement Intuitive insight 
Problem solving 
intuition 
Deciding about an alternative 
or about a direction 
Creating solution which entails 
new knowledge 
Moral intuition 
Judging whether an action is 
good or evil 
Creating a new moral value 
Aesthetic intuition 
Judging something as 
beautiful or ugly 
Creating something beautiful 
Figure 4: Two-dimensional typology of intuition 
In decision making5 as well as in creativity we also may find both intuitive judgement and 
intuitive insight.  This is the very reason that it is so problematic to recognize intuitive judge-
ment and intuitive insight as two separate types of intuition; they can rarely be attained in a 
pure form (see Figure 3).  An intuitive decision process may not only involve intuitive judge-
ments but also intuitive insights.  For instance, generating decision alternatives may involve 
creativity and thus intuitive insight.  Conversely, a creative process may involve, apart from 
intuitive insights, instances of intuitive judgement, e.g. when choosing in which direction to 
continue the research.  However, the dominant role in decision taking is played by intuitive 
judgement and the dominant role in creativity is played by intuitive insight.  Therefore we 
                                                     
5 This time referring to the more comprehensive process which includes decision taking. 
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cannot conceptualize creativity involving intuition without coming to terms about delineating 
intuitive judgement from intuitive insight. 
In this section, we have argued that, there are certain differences between intuitive judge-
ment and intuitive insight, however the six characteristics of intuition outlined in the intro-
duction apply to both of them.  Similarly, the structure of intuiting as an integrative process 
applies both of them.  In the case of intuitive judgement, the decision aspects are tacitly inte-
grated into a picture about what to do.  In the case of intuitive insight, the components of the 
domain knowledge are tacitly integrated in a novel way producing knowledge that did not 
exist before. 
Conclusions 
Based on two earlier research projects (and exploration of the literature), we distinguish be-
tween intuitive judgement and intuitive insight.  This way of conceptualizing types of intuition 
takes an alternative perspective from the typologies available in the literature; and we believe 
helps illuminate the role of intuition in creativity, which is less well conceptualized in the man-
agement literature than intuitive judgement. 
The main limitation of the present inquiry stems from the initial assumptions, namely that 
we have only examined intuitive knowledge and not the other three levels of intuitive aware-
ness (i.e. physical, emotional and spiritual).  Therefore the results only apply to intuitive 
knowledge.  Additional research will be needed to understand the relationship between intu-
itive judgement and insight in the other three intuitive faculties.  There may also be synergies 
between all four to be explored.  Another potential limitation is the observation made earlier 
that there are many ways of distinguishing between kinds of intuition, several of which were 
mentioned.  We chose to distinguish two kinds of intuition based on the areas in which intui-
tion is used and have come up with a conceptual process to delineate between intuitive judge-
ment and intuitive insight and also how to delineate these forms of intuition from their non-
intuitive counterparts.  Other ways of identifying kinds of intuition may lead to different re-
sults and the relation of the present typology to other typologies could be of further interest.  
Finally, this paper is predominantly based on a critical review of literature and conceptual 
modelling building upon theoretical and empirical works of others.  Therefore it lacks empir-
ical support in the sense of purposeful observations or experiments; these remain open topics 
for further research. 
Apart from the future research directions directly arising from the limitations of the cur-
rent research, there are also several obvious areas for exploring the relationships of the two 
types of intuition proposed here to other constructs in the area of intuition.  Three particularly 
promising paths from the previously discussed literature ĂƌĞ^ŽŶĞŶƐŚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ(2007) sensemak-
ing-intuition model, the various models of knowledge levels and the two process oriented 
papers (Glöckner & Witteman, 2009; Gore & Sadler-Smith, 2011). 
Our idea of future use of the model is twofold:  First, we would like to provide a useful 
starting point for management researchers pursuing their inquiries into (or through) the area 
of intuition; second, we would like to provide a comprehensive tool for the educators of cur-
18 
rent and future knowledge workers for explaining intuition.  Additionally, we believe that bet-
ter understanding of the role of intuition in creativity can be beneficial for knowledge-ori-
ented organizations.  With regards to our own future research, the present model is part of a 
larger project involving a series of models and aiming at a dynamic model(s) of knowledge 
and then at a dynamic model of cognition. 
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